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Note 
Notes from Underground: Hydraulic Fracturing 
in the Marcellus Shale 
Joseph A. Dammel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hydraulic fracturing for natural gas is fundamentally 
altering the subsurface and societal landscapes where it is 
practiced. Nowhere is this more apparent than within the 
Marcellus Shale formation, the richest shale gas resource in the 
world, which underlies large swaths of the densely populated 
Eastern United States. The subsurface has long been “carved 
up, conveyed, used, bought, sold, and developed.”1 Much of this 
activity has centered upon the extraction of the fossil fuels used 
to power our modern life. Recent developments have rocked 
this landscape, bringing increasing scrutiny and opposition to 
the extraction of natural gas via hydraulic fracturing. 
Hydraulic fracturing, or “fracing,” is a method of extracting 
natural gas2 now occurring at an unprecedented scale in areas 
like Pennsylvania, largely unaccustomed to the oil and gas 
© 2011 Joseph A. Dammel. 
* Joint Degree Candidate, J.D. & M.S. in Science, Technology, and 
Environmental Policy, 2013, University of Minnesota Law School & The 
Humphrey School of Public Affairs. The author would like to thank Professor 
Klass for her guidance throughout this process, Elizabeth, Jeff, and Melisa for 
lending their considerable expertise on all things subsurface and policy, and 
the editors and staff of the journal for all their hard work. Their help improved 
the quality of this Note immeasurably; all remaining errors are the author’s, 
solely. Finally, the author would like to thank his friends and family for their 
willingness to sit through hours of one-sided, animated discussion on a method 
of natural gas extraction. Admittedly, not the best table-talk. 
 1. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change, Carbon 
Sequestration, & Property Rights, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 388–89. 
 2. Nicolle R. Snyder Bagnell & Stephanie L. Hadgkiss, Eastern Shale 
Plays—A Game Plan for Success, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 32-1, at 32-5 
(2009). 
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industry.3 The previously untapped resources now accessible 
via fracing create a potentially tremendous impact on national 
energy security and local economic well-being, but the practice 
is not without environmental risks. Further, it may be difficult 
to balance these risks and interests under traditional oil and 
gas regulatory regimes. A new approach to subsurface law and 
regulation is necessary in order to strike the right balance 
between public and private interests.4 
Hydraulic fracturing is an extractive method used by oil 
and gas companies to open pathways in “tight” geologic 
formations so the oil or gas trapped within can be recovered at 
a higher flow rate, and thus generate greater financial returns. 
Fracing pumps a water-chemical mixture at high pressure into 
the ground, separating fractures within the rock and injecting 
small particles into the openings to prevent them from 
reclosing. The resulting passages allow the gas or oil to flow 
through a well to the surface.5 Hydraulic fracturing acts as the 
key that unlocks previously trapped stores of gas. Recently, a 
confluence of factors has made hydraulic fracturing more 
economical6 and developers have responded by purchasing 
mineral interests and drilling more wells.7 This trend has been 
especially relevant in the world’s largest shale gas reserve, the 
Marcellus Shale play,8 which stretches over 95,000 square 
miles in the Eastern United States9 and contains an estimated 
 3. See generally id. at 32-1 to -3 (describing the history of natural gas 
production in the Appalachian region as a period of boom and bust, with the 
recent development of the Marcellus Shale formation seen as having great 
potential for an area once thought to be past its prime). 
 4. This Note will generally associate public interests with environmental 
protection and private interests as resource-centric, economic interests. 
 5. See infra Part I.B for a more detailed explanation of the technical 
aspects of hydraulic fracturing. 
 6. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 9 (2009) (“Three factors have come together in 
recent years to make shale gas production economically viable: 1) advances in 
horizontal drilling, 2) advances in hydraulic fracturing, and, perhaps most 
importantly, 3) rapid increases in natural gas prices . . . .”) [hereinafter DOE 
PRIMER]. 
 7. See id. at 50 (describing the new fracturing made possible by drilling 
advances). 
 8. A play describes the “extent of a petroleum-bearing geological 
formation.” Play Definition in Oil Gas Glossary, OILGASGLOSSARY.COM, 
http://oilgasglossary.com/play.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2011). 
 9. See Bagnell & Hadgkiss, supra note 2, at 32-1. 
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489 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of recoverable natural gas.10 For 
comparison, the United States consumed 22.7 TCF of natural 
gas in 2009.11 
This Note will focus on hydraulic fracturing in 
Pennsylvania,12 the epicenter of the Marcellus Shale 
controversy. Unlike some of the other states where hydraulic 
fracturing is practiced, Pennsylvania has relatively little recent 
experience in the extractive industries.13 The state provides a 
case study for the nexus of energy, climate, and water issues, 
as well as the role of state and federal regulation. Part II of this 
Note will give an overview of the context surrounding hydraulic 
fracturing, as well as a brief technical primer on the process. 
Next, a discussion on the legal principles governing subsurface 
disputes will lead into a summary of state and federal 
regulatory action regarding fracing, with a focus on 
Pennsylvania’s regulatory structure. Part III presents a 
summary of previously proposed changes to regulation of 
hydraulic fracturing and provides a collection of proposals that 
protect public concerns and bolster private interests. Natural 
gas is a critical chapter of our present and future energy story 
and hydraulic fracturing will be an important character as the 
rest is written. The great potential of this practice is bounded 
by significant public concern and scientific uncertainty. Moving 
forward, a clear and equitable legal and regulatory framework 
must buttress effective management of this important resource. 
 10. See, e.g., Timothy Considine et al., An Emerging Giant: Prospects and 
Economic Impacts of Developing the Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Play 4 
(Aug. 5, 2009), available at http://marcelluscoalition.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/EconomicImpactsofDevelopingMarcellus.pdf. 
(estimating that gas developers in Pennsylvania spent $2 billion on payments 
to landowners in 2008 and that 2,445 TCF of gas exists within the Marcellus 
Shale formation). 
 11. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011 EARLY 
RELEASE OVERVIEW 6 (2010) [hereinafter DOE EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW]. 
 12. Although several states fall within the Marcellus Shale formation, 
Pennsylvania is the focus of this Note because of the state’s response to fracing 
and because the formation covers almost the entire state. Considine et al., 
supra note 10, at 10. 
 13. See Bagnell & Hadgkiss, supra note 2, at 32-2 (noting that despite the 
long history of the extractive industry in Pennsylvania, the state, by the mid 
1960s had become an importer of gas). 
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II. THE TECHNICAL, LEGAL, AND REGULATORY 
LANDSCAPE OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
A. UNPACKING THE PIECES OF AN ENERGY PUZZLE 
Natural gas constitutes approximately one quarter of 
energy use in the United States with demand mainly split 
between the industrial, electricity, commercial, and residential 
sectors.14 Natural gas is used to heat buildings, generate 
electricity, and power industrial processes.15 Consumption of 
natural gas is expected to remain relatively constant over the 
next two decades as unconventional resources16 such as shale 
gas from fracing grow to replace diminishing conventional 
sources.17 According to one government estimate, production of 
shale gas and coalbed methane is expected to double in the 
Northeast as a percentage of the total amount of natural gas 
produced by 2035.18 
Natural gas has been drilled since the early 1800s and the 
ebb and flow of the industry has greatly affected the well-being, 
economic and otherwise, of communities dependent on the 
 14. See CLIMATE TECHBOOK: NATURAL GAS, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2010), 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Natural_Gas_09%2011%2017_clean_0.
pdf [hereinafter PEW CTR.]; 
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010, at 56 (2010) 
[hereinafter DOE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010]. 
 15. PEW CTR., supra note 14. 
 16. Conventional reservoirs produce gas from sands and carbonate 
formations in which the gas is stored in the pores of the rock after it seeps 
from the less permeable shale formations where it is sourced. DOE PRIMER, 
supra note 6, at 15. The well is drilled into the sand and carbonate formations 
and the gas flows to the surface. Id. Unconventional reservoirs require more 
energy and complex drilling (horizontal) to extract the gas, usually through 
fracing. Id. The three basic types of unconventional reservoirs, many of which 
are hydraulically fractured, are tight gas (low-porosity sandstones and 
carbonate reservoirs), coalbed natural gas (coal seams), and shale gas (like the 
Marcellus formation). Id. 
 17. See DOE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010, supra note 14, at 56, 72. 
 18. Id. at 72. As an illustration of the rapidly-developing state of shale gas 
estimates, only 8 months after releasing an estimate that the country had 346 
trillion cubic feet (TCF) of “technically recoverable unproved shale gas 
resources,” the U.S. Department of Energy released another projection that 
more than doubled that total, to a new estimate of 827 TCF; estimated 
production from shale gas resources in 2035 has tracked a similar increase 
from the previous year’s estimate. DOE EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW, supra 
note 11, at 8. 
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industry.19 The latest rush to extract shale gas using hydraulic 
fracturing has been a financial boon for many once caught in 
the ebb of the extraction industry or left out completely, but the 
potential environmental impacts—namely water contamination 
and resource depletion—have initiated a closer examination of 
the practice and its regulation.20 
The Marcellus shale stretches across much of Pennsylvania 
and through portions of eight other surrounding states.21 The 
Marcellus shale play is not the only significant shale formation 
at which hydraulic fracturing is performed. Texas has several 
shale gas basins, the most notable being the Barnett in the Fort 
Worth Basin and the Haynesville on the state’s eastern 
border.22 In Michigan, the Antrim shale formation, extending 
across the northern portion of the state, has been developed 
since the 1980s, and is unique among other gas-containing 
shales because it is shallow, thin, and contains a large amount 
of water.23 And in Wyoming, the Hilliard-Baxter-Mancos 
formation stretches across the state’s southwestern quadrant in 
the heart of the Rocky Mountains.24 These formations exist at 
depths between 600 feet (Antrim) and 13,500 feet (Haynesville) 
and at a net thickness of between 50 feet (Marcellus) and 600 
feet (Barnett).25 Estimates of unconventional reserves present 
 19. See Considine et al., supra note 10, at 1–2. 
 20. See, e.g., AMY MALL ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, 
DRILLING DOWN: PROTECTING WESTERN COMMUNITIES FROM THE HEALTH 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION 14–21 (2007) 
(describing how oil and gas production activities can harm water supplies and 
providing examples from across the country); Clifford Krauss & Tom Zeller, 
Jr., When a Rig Moves In Next Door, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010, at BU 1 
(comparing the opposition from many in the Marcellus Shale region to 
hydraulic fracturing  to the enthusiastic reception of a poor county in 
Louisiana, which has received an influx of money from production royalties); 
Editorial, The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, at A28 (calling 
for more regulation on the fracing industry after growing reports of water 
contamination associated with the practice) [hereinafter Halliburton 
Loophole]; Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Initiates Hydraulic 
Fracturing Study: Agency Seeks Input From Science Advisory Board (Mar. 18, 
2010) (announcing a plan for a 2-year, comprehensive, peer-reviewed study to 
investigate the impact of hydraulic fracturing on human and environmental 
health). 
 21. The other states are: Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, 
Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. DOE PRIMER, supra note 6, at 
21. 
 22. See id. at 18, 20. 
 23. Id. at 23. 
 24. See Id. at 8. 
 25. Id. at 17. 
 778 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 12:2 
 
                                                          
 
something of a moving target as advancements in technology 
and exploration typically cause initial estimates of the amount 
of recoverable gas to increase, sometimes dramatically, 
following the initial discovery and subsequent development of 
the formation.26 
B. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, TECHNICALLY 
First, it is important to understand the basics of the 
technology behind the controversy. Hydraulic fracturing 
technology was developed in Texas in the 1950s and was first 
used extensively in the Barnett shale play in Texas in the 
1980s.27 It has since become common industry practice and is 
used in an estimated 90% of the over 450,000 operating natural 
gas wells in the United States.28 After the drilling and casing of 
the well, the process commences by injecting a high-pressure 
mixture of water and chemicals into a formation containing 
natural gas trapped in tight pore spaces in the rock.29 The gas 
is released and travels through the newly opened fractures and 
flows towards wells collecting the gas.30 Fracing makes 
formations economical where it would otherwise be too 
expensive or too unproductive to wrest gas from the tight shale 
formations.31 
Two key technological advancements in recent decades 
have made production from unconventional gas reserves more 
profitable: advances in horizontal drilling and refining of 
 26. See, e.g., Considine, supra note 10, at 4 (noting that the estimate of 
gas in the Marcellus shale increased from 1.9 trillion cubic feet in 2002 to 489 
trillion cubic feet just five years later). 
 27. DOE PRIMER, supra note 6, at 13. 
 28. See Energy Policy Act of 2005: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Energy and Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th 
Cong. 115 (2005) (statement of Victor Carrillo, Chairman, Texas Oil and Gas 
Comm’n), available at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/99906.pdf; Number of 
Producing Gas Wells, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_wells_s1_a.htmhttp://eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_
wells_s1_a.htmhttp://eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_wells_s1_a.htm (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2011). 
 29. DOE PRIMER, supra note 6, at 56–64. 
 30. MALL ET AL., supra note 20, at 14. 
 31. J. Daniel Arthur et al., ALL Consulting, Hydraulic Fracturing 
Considerations for Natural Gas Wells of the Marcellus Shale 3 (Sept. 21, 2008) 
(transcript available at 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/GWPCMarcellus.pdf). 
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hydraulic fracturing itself.32 Horizontal drilling allows the well 
driller to extend the well laterally across the gas-containing 
formation to achieve greater coverage of the resource.33 It is 
more capital-intensive to drill horizontal wells than it is to drill 
vertical wells, but the tradeoff is greater production and a 
smaller footprint on the surface.34 Once the well is drilled and 
the casing is in place, the hydraulic fracturing begins. A typical 
well requires two to four million gallons of water for the drilling 
and fracturing.35 The water is mixed with proprietary 
chemicals and propping agents that help facilitate the process 
and hold the fractures open to ease gas flow.36 The process 
proceeds in stages, with each stage fracturing another length of 
the horizontal well.37 Once the process is complete, the fracing 
fluid is recovered, treated, and disposed.38 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 
Although the technical underpinnings of hydraulic 
fracturing are largely understood, at least by industry 
operators, the environmental effects are less known.39 Across 
the country, reports of water contamination in areas where 
hydraulic fracturing is practiced have surfaced, blaming the 
industry for methane gas or other harmful substances now 
present in residents’ water supplies.40 One extensively reported 
 32. See PEW CTR., supra note 14, at 8. 
 33. J. Daniel Arthur et al., supra note 31, at 8 (comparing a vertical well’s 
coverage of 50 feet with a horizontal well’s coverage of up to 6,000 feet as an 
example of the benefits of horizontal wells). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See DOE PRIMER, supra note 6, at 64. 
 36. For a more detailed explanation of the fracing process, see generally 
id. at 56–64. 
 37. See id. at 60–61. 
 38. See id. at 66 (noting that the majority of the “flowback” water  is 
recovered in hours to weeks, but sometimes months after the fracing process 
stops); see also NEW YORK DEP’T OF ENVT’L CONSERVATION, SUPPLEMENTAL 
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND 
SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 5–97 (2009), available at 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/58440.html (reporting that a typical range of 
“flowback water,” or frac water that flows out of the well upon completion of 
the frac job ranges from between 9 and 35 percent of the total fluid pumped; 
the remainder stays underground). 
 39. See Editorial, Questions About Fracturing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2010, 
at A30. 
 40. E.g., Abrahm Lustgarten, Officials in Three States Pin Water Woes on 
Gas Drilling, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 26, 2009, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/officials-in-three-states-pin-water-woes-on-
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example of contamination from the Marcellus shale region is a 
small town in Pennsylvania, Dimock, that has been forced to 
cope with widespread reports of methane found in the drinking 
water.41 In that instance, the gas company, Cabot Oil and Gas 
Co., was required to build a 5.5-mile pipeline to bring clean 
water to the town at a cost of $11.8 million, and entered into a 
$4.1 million settlement with the state and residents of 
Dimock.42 
A 2004 study by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) focused on the effect on drinking water supplies of 
hydraulic fracturing injection into coalbed methane43 wells and 
found that injection of fracing fluids poses “little to no” threat 
to underground sources of drinking water and thus required no 
further study.44 The study was criticized for its narrow focus on 
the effect of injection of the fracing fluids (and not for other 
related activities such as disposal or storage of the frac fluids 
on or near the surface) and for ignoring other environmental 
concerns such as water quantity, fish kills, and acid burns.45 
Importantly, this study focused on a different gas-containing 
formation (coalbeds), and was completed before the more recent 
gas-drilling-426; Joaquin Sapien, With Natural Gas Drilling Boom, 
Pennsylvania Faces an Onslaught of Wastewater, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 43, 2009, 
11:05 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/wastewater-from-gas-drilling-
boom-may-threaten-monongahela-river; Mark Levy, Pa. Investigating Spill at 
Natural Gas Well Site, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 23, 2010, 3:57 PM), 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9JM2L9O1.htm (reporting 
on a suspected leak of 13,000 gallons of fracing fluid that was impacting 
nearby waterways). 
 41. See, e.g., Jad Mouawad & Clifford Krauss, Dark Side of a Natural Gas 
Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2009, at B1 (reporting on the trials of the residents 
of Dimock and placing that within the larger context of the shale gas boom 
happening in the Marcellus shale and in other locations around the country). 
 42. Press Release, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection, Dimock Residents to Share $4.1 million, Receive Gas Mitigation 
Systems Under DEP-Negotiated Settlement with Cabot Oil and Gas (Dec. 15, 
2010), available at 
http://www.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt?open=18&objID=1022650&mode=2. 
 43. Coalbed methane is another source of unconventional gas in which the 
trapped gas is physically adsorbed to the coal; hydraulic fracturing is used to 
release the gas. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO 
UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF 
COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 2 (2004). 
 44. Id. at 16. 
 45. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic 
Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 134–37 (2009). 
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reports of contamination from Marcellus shale operations.46 In 
2010, acting on a Congressional mandate and increasing 
reports of water contamination, the EPA announced plans for a 
comprehensive “lifecycle” study on the practice to be completed 
in 2012.47 
D. LEGAL DOCTRINES AND CASES GOVERNING HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING 
The case law that governs hydraulic fracturing disputes 
primarily addresses property and tort law claims—not claims of 
environmental contamination from fracing,48 though that may 
be changing.49 Hydraulic fracturing presents a rather unique 
scenario because the technology opens up vast new reserves for 
exploration and discovery: regions with extraction operations 
once thought to be declining are now faced with a new 
subsurface use that may have difficulty integrating within 
existing and future subsurface interests.50 This section will 
provide an overview of the significant legal doctrines in oil and 
gas law governing hydraulic fracturing, and more generally, 
other subsurface activities like geologic carbon dioxide (CO2) 
sequestration. Detailed discussion of this area of law is 
relevant because it helps to highlight traditional notions of 
subsurface use, which may need to be updated to reflect newer 
activities in the near future. 
1. Notions of Ownership, Subsurface Trespass, and Other 
Remedies 
Subsurface trespass is a common cause of action in the oil 
and gas field. It occurs when an element of an extraction 
activity, such as a directional well or fracture, interferes with 
 46. See id. at 141. 
 47. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SCOPING MATERIALS FOR INITIAL DESIGN 
OF EPA RESEARCH STUDY ON POTENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 2 (2010), 
available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/3B745430D624ED3B852576D400
514B76/$File/Hydraulic+Frac+Scoping+Doc+for+SAB-3-22-10+Final.pdf. See 
infra Part II.E.1 for further description of this study. 
 48. Wiseman, supra note 45, at 146. 
 49. See, e.g., Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 
508 (2010) (case charging a gas company with contamination of a 
Pennsylvania town’s drinking water due to hydraulic fracturing). 
 50. See Bagnell & Hadgkiss, supra note 2, at 32-2 to -5. 
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another interest holder’s property and causes harm.51 “For oil 
and gas purposes, a subsurface trespass is the bottoming of a 
well on the land of another without his or her consent.”52 Two 
aspects of the hydraulic fracturing process—the fracture itself 
and the migrating plume of injected or displaced fluids—are 
subject to subsurface trespass claims. Further, case law in the 
oil and gas field has several ancillary doctrines and policy 
considerations that may impact the subsurface trespass claim. 
a. “Heaven to Hell” 
One of the oldest legal doctrines is cujus est solum, ejus est 
usque ad coelum et ad inferos, or, ownership of the land extends 
up to the sky and down to the center of the earth.53 Ownership 
of the airspace was the first portion of this maxim to be 
discarded after the rise of air travel; otherwise, planes would 
commit thousands of tiny trespasses daily as they flew over 
private land.54 As applied to the subsurface, this doctrine has 
resisted change, but its practical validity has been lost over 
time as subsurface use has become more complex and courts 
have had to decide whether ownership did in fact extend to the 
center of the earth.55 Surface owners may now find it difficult 
to succeed on an alleged trespass involving the deep subsurface 
without existing or reasonably anticipated use of the affected 
porespace, which is the physical space within a rock formation 
within which gas or liquids can be stored. 
b. The Rule of Capture 
Unlike its now much-weakened counterpart ad coelum, the 
rule of capture is an ancient legal doctrine still relevant in 
present day subsurface trespass cases.56 A typical definition of 
 51. See, e.g., Starrh & Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy L.L.C., 63 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (defining subsurface trespass as 
migration of oil field wastewater into the groundwater porespace of another 
without that landowner’s consent). 
 52. 38 AM. JUR. 2D GAS AND OIL § 306 (2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citations omitted). 
 53. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 42 (9th ed. 2009) (ad coelum et ad infernos). 
 54. For a discussion on the development of this doctrine, see Klass & 
Wilson, supra note 1, at 386–89. 
 55. See generally John Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 
UCLA L. Rev. 979 (2008) (discussing the history of the doctrine, as well as 
recent cases that have called its validity into question). 
 56. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 
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the rule of capture is that “there is no liability for drainage of 
oil and gas from under the lands of another so long as there has 
been no trespass.”57 The doctrine puts the onus on the 
landowner alleging trespass to actively develop their mineral 
interests, as they are faced with the possibility that a neighbor 
will drain the resources before they do. The policy behind this 
rule is one that encourages production of fossil fuel resources 
and discourages litigation. A recent case of an alleged 
subsurface trespass provides a good illustration of how the 
doctrine is applied in the context of hydraulic fracturing 
operations. 
In Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, a case 
from the Supreme Court of Texas, royalty interest owners of a 
tight natural gas formation sued the operator of the wells on 
their land, Coastal Oil & Gas, for breach of implied covenants 
to develop the gas wells on their tract.58 Coastal owned and 
operated adjacent tracts of land to the suing interest-holders.59 
After drilling an especially productive well on the interest-
holders’ land, the company began to drill wells on other tracts 
of land near the productive well in an alleged attempt to drain 
the gas from under the interest-holders’ land and thus forego 
the royalty payments they would otherwise have had to make if 
the gas were produced from the interest-holders’ well.60 The 
interest-holders also alleged that the “incursion of hydraulic 
fracturing fluid and proppants into another’s land two miles 
below the surface constitutes a trespass.”61 
The Texas court held that, although the depositing of 
proppants or a like material on the surface of the interest-
holders’ land would be a trespass, it noted the demise of the ad 
coelum doctrine in the application of the law of trespass: “The 
law of trespass need no more be the same two miles below the 
1, 13 (Tex. 2008) (“The rule of capture is a cornerstone of the oil and gas 
industry and is fundamental both to property rights and to state regulation.”). 
 57. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (9th ed. 2009). Another definition, 
surprisingly, can be found in pop culture, “Here, if you have a milkshake, and 
I have a milkshake, and I have a straw—there it is, that’s a straw, you see? 
You watching? My straw reaches across the room, and starts to drink your 
milkshake. I drink your milkshake! . . . I drink it up!” THERE WILL BE BLOOD 
(Paramount Vantage 2007) (oil prospector Daniel Plainview describing 
drainage). 
 58. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d at 6. 
 59. Id. at 5. 
 60. Id. at 7–8. 
 61. Id. at 9. 
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surface than two miles above.”62 The court did not rule 
explicitly on whether hydraulic fracturing constituted a 
trespass, and noted earlier decisions in which it also declined to 
do so, but it did bar recovery of the interest-holders under the 
rule of capture.63 In doing so, the court also suggested that to 
allow recovery for the value of gas lost to another’s hydraulic 
fracturing would “usurp[] to courts and juries the lawful and 
preferable authority of the Railroad Commission to regulate oil 
and gas production.”64 
The rule of capture is not entirely draconian, for it offers a 
party alleging drainage of resources several options for 
recourse. That party can drill a well on its property to offset the 
alleged drainage.65 Or, if the surface owner leases mineral 
rights, he can sue the mineral interest-holder for breach of 
implied covenants to protect against drainage.66 Finally, an 
owner may offer to pool its resources with surrounding interest-
holders, and if the offer to pool resources is rejected, the owner 
could apply to the Railroad Commission (or similar permitting 
agency) to force pooling of the shared gas or oil resource.67 
Importantly, “[t]he minerals owner is entitled, not to the 
molecules actually residing below the surface, but to a fair 
chance to recover the oil and gas in or under his land, or their 
equivalents in kind.”68 
c. The Negative Rule of Capture 
The negative rule of capture addresses the injection of a 
material, such as fracing fluid, which migrates into another’s 
property, potentially causing the displacement of a more 
 62. Id. at 11. 
 63. Id. at 12–13 (“In this case, actionable trespass requires injury, and 
[interest-holders’] only claim of injury—that Coastal’s fracing operation made 
it possible for gas to flow from beneath Share 13 to the Share 12 wells—is 
precluded by the rule of capture. That rule gives a mineral rights owner title 
to the oil and gas produced from a lawful well bottomed on the property, even 
if the oil and gas flowed to the well from beneath another owner’s tract.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 64. Id. at 14–15. This last sentence has implications for the shielding of 
operator liability through permits and is discussed in further detail in Parts 
II.D.1.c, e and again in Part III.A.2. 
 65. Id. at 14. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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valuable substance, such as natural gas, with a less valuable 
one, such as salty brine water.69 The rule states that such an 
interaction is allowed as part of a “reasonable program of 
development” as long as it does not cause “injury to producing 
or potentially producing formations.”70 This rule applies to 
various injection operations, including secondary recovery 
operations, disposal of brine, gas storage, and carbon dioxide 
storage—basically any underground activity that injects 
material underground.71 One important caveat and recent 
development of this rule is that the regulatory permitting of the 
injection activity does not fully insulate the injector from 
liability resulting from migration of valuable substances, as 
once believed.72 
Several notable cases address this doctrine, albeit in 
different fashions. In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manziel, 
the issue was “whether a trespass is committed when 
secondary recovery waters from an authorized secondary 
recovery project cross lease lines.”73 Here, the court held that a 
trespass did not occur and that “[t]he technical rules of trespass 
have no place in the consideration of the validity of the orders 
of the [Texas Railroad] Commission.”74 Other cases focus on the 
injury to the plaintiffs’ formations that may override a 
regulatory permit to inject.75 In Boyce v. Dundee Healdton 
Sand Unit, an Oklahoma case, a secondary recovery operation’s 
fluid migrated under plaintiffs’ land, from which they had been 
producing oil.76 The defendants argued that the ratification of 
 69. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 204.5. at 2 (LexisNexis 
2010). 
 70. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71. Id. at 2–3. 
 72. See id. at 3–4 (noting that while permitted operations are afforded 
some protection from liability, there are several cases in which the operator 
was found liable for trespass or nuisance causes of action when injected fluids 
harmed another’s subsurface interests even when the injections were 
permitted by a regulatory agency). 
 73. R.R. Comm’n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 567 (Tex. 1962). 
 74. Id. at 568–69. 
 75. See, e.g., Morsey v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 779 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D. 
Kan. 1991) (holding that a regulatory order does not shield a party from 
liability if the permitted operations cause harm to another); Mowrer v. 
Ashland, 518 F.2d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that if an activity 
introduces a risk of serious harm to the property interests of others, it should 
be held to a strict liability standard for that harm). 
 76. Boyce v. Dundee Healdton Sand Unit, 560 P.2d 234, 235 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 1977). 
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the oil and gas agency’s unitization order, which allowed the 
defendants to implement secondary recovery techniques, also 
shielded them from liability.77 The court held that ratification 
of the unitization order did not constitute consent to damage 
from the secondary recovery operation and thus did not 
insulate the defendants from liability for the damage.78 
d. Ownership Theories 
Whether the rule of capture is followed in a jurisdiction 
depends in part on the theory of ownership the jurisdiction 
adopts. The majority rule is called “ownership-in-place” and it 
holds that the mineral interest owner has present possession of 
the oil and gas in place and the right to use the surface to 
develop the interest. However, if the oil and gas flows out from 
under the interest holder’s land, the interest terminates.79 
“Nonownership” theory is the minority rule, and it states that a 
severed mineral interest holder does not have a right to possess 
the oil and gas described in the deed—that interest holder has 
only the right to explore and develop the interest.80 This would 
seem to lead to an easy case for subsurface trespass in 
ownership-in-place jurisdictions and an impossible one in 
jurisdictions that follow the nonownership theory, since the 
affected interest would not actually be in the interest holder’s 
possession when the alleged trespass occurs. However, in 
practice, courts make little differentiation in nonownership 
jurisdictions, which generally follow the subsurface trespass 
rule of ownership-in-place jurisdictions and allow for relief if a 
mineral interest is harmed.81 
 77. Id. at 238. 
 78. Id. 
 79. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1215 (9th ed. 2009). 
 80. Id. at 1156; see also Terry Ragsdale, Hydraulic Fracturing: The 
Stealthy Subsurface Trespass, 28 TULSA L.J. 311, 314 (1993) (stating the 
definition of nonownership theory, significant jurisdictions that follow the 
theory, and the theory’s origins). 
 81. See Ragsdale, supra note 80, at 327 (describing the potential conflict of 
nonownership jurisdictions applying subsurface trespass and the willingness 
of courts in those jurisdictions to apply the doctrine of ownership-in-place 
instead); see also Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Tex. 
1961) (holding, in one of the earliest hydraulic fracturing cases, that fractures 
or veins extending onto another’s land constitute “entry upon another’s land” 
and thus trespass); Pac. W. Oil Co. v. Bern Oil Co., 87 P.2d 1045, 1050–51 
(Cal. 1939) (holding that gas wells deliberately drilled close to the boundary of 
respondent’s land to draw oil was a trespass). 
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A Pennsylvania case from the early 1980s presents an 
interesting application of ownership theory in an ownership-in-
place jurisdiction. In U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, the dispute 
centered around a gas rights owner’s attempt to hydraulically 
fracture the coal interest owner’s coal to extract coalbed 
methane gas.82 The surface owner had, in 1920, severed the 
coal rights and granted them to U.S. Steel Corp. with a deed 
containing a provision that the surface owners “hereby reserve 
the right to drill and operate through said coal for oil and gas 
without being held liable for any damages.”83 The surface 
owner later severed the oil and gas rights in the late 1970s and 
granted the rights to another party that had planned to 
hydraulically fracture the coal-owner’s coal to extract the gas.84 
The question was whether the owner of the coal also owned 
the gas held within the coal seam, or if the gas interest-holder 
owned the gas.85 The court began by describing its ownership-
in-place doctrine: “The fact that gas is of a fugacious character 
does not prevent ownership in it from being granted prior to its 
being reduced to possession. We have long recognized that gas 
may be owned prior to being recovered from its natural 
underground habitat.”86 The court then classified gas interests 
as ferae naturae, or akin to a wild animal, because of the ability 
of gas to move from one location to another, unencumbered by 
human-made boundaries.87 This distinction meant that the 
owner of the interest, whether wild animal or natural gas, was 
the owner of the land or geologic formation on or within which 
that interest resided.88 Thus the coal interest-holder, U.S. 
Steel, had rights to the gas contained within the coal it owned, 
and the gas interest-holder had rights to the gas surrounding 
the coal formation, including the right to drill through the coal 
formation to reach the underlying gas.89 Finally, in addressing 
the temporal aspect of the deed, the court noted that it was not 
 82. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1382 (Pa. 1983). 
 83. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1383. 
 87. Id. at 1387 (quoting Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. 
DeWitt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889)). 
 88. Id. at 1388 (“In accordance with the foregoing principles governing gas 
ownership, therefore, such gas as is present in coal must necessarily belong to 
the owner of the coal, so long as it remains within his property and subject to 
his exclusive dominion and control.”) (emphasis in original). 
 89. Id. at 1389. 
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perpetual, but “[r]ather, the coal owner’s interest in that situs 
has been regarded as being in the nature of an estate 
determinable, which reverts to the surface landowner by 
operation of law at some time subsequent to removal of the 
coal.”90 
A recent Kansas case highlights the different approaches 
courts take when deciding ownership of resources in a geologic 
formation.91 With very similar facts to Hoge, Central Natural 
Resources, Inc. v. Davis Operating Co. involved a dispute 
between a coal interest-holder and a gas interest-holder who 
was drilling for coalbed methane.92 In an action for quiet title, 
the coal owner asked the Kansas court to follow the “container 
theory” of coalbed methane ownership that they argued was 
adopted in Hoge.93 The court declined to do so and instead 
interpreted the intent of the original parties to the severance 
deed as granting only the solid coal to the grantee, as coalbed 
methane was believed to be a valueless waste gas of the coal 
mining process in the 1920s.94 
This discussion on ownership theories highlights the 
differences (or lack thereof) between jurisdictions practicing 
one theory or the other. It also underscores the idiosyncratic 
nature of oil and gas law and the difference between theory and 
practice. Finally, it provides important context for the debate 
on hydraulic fracturing, since the practice invites a more 
complex discussion on the nature of ownership than traditional 
oil and gas disputes. 
e. The Fracture and the Flood 
Subsurface trespass cases involving hydraulic fracturing 
tend to hinge upon one of two processes: either the creation of 
the fracture or the flood of injected (or displaced) fluid. 
In Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., the Texas Supreme 
Court held that the trial court, upon motion by the owner of the 
surrounding land, could enjoin the owner of a tract of land from 
 90. Id. at 1384 (citations omitted). 
 91. Cent. Natural Res., Inc. v. Davis Operating Co., 201 P.3d 680, 686–87 
(Kan. 2009). 
 92. Id. at 683. 
 93. Id. at 684–686 (the “container theory” states that the grantee of the 
coal interest owns everything, including gas, contained within the coal 
formation(s)). 
 94. Id. at 684–85, 691. 
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fracturing his land to recover gas.95 The court noted that Gregg 
planned to drill 9,400 feet to reach the gas-bearing formation, 
but was unable to say whether the resulting fractures would 
extend into the surrounding formation, which was owned by 
Delhi-Taylor.96 The question became, then, whether the trial 
court had the power to issue an injunction to determine 
whether the fractures entered into the surrounding land and, if 
so, to enjoin Gregg from proceeding with gas production.97 The 
court held that the trial court did have this power, noting that 
no difference exists between a directional well entering 
another’s subsurface property and fractures from a hydraulic 
fracturing doing so.98 Additionally, the court noted that the 
rules promulgated by the Railroad Commission of Texas 
allowing trespass in waterflooding or other secondary recovery 
operations are not applicable in fracturing cases.99 Other cases 
have also addressed the issue of fractures extending into 
another owner’s land, sometimes inconsistently.100 
Waterflooding of underground formations is a method of 
enhanced recovery where injected water effectively “pushes” 
gas and oil towards a production well, akin to wringing the 
“sponge” of a formation to extract as much as possible. In 
Manziel,101 the issue was “whether a trespass is committed 
when secondary recovery waters from an authorized secondary 
recovery project cross lease lines.”102 The court referenced the 
Gregg opinion, which left open the question of whether an 
“authorized” activity crossing lease lines would be considered a 
trespass.103 It concluded that if the Railroad Commission of 
Texas, in an effort to prevent waste, “authorizes secondary 
recovery projects, a trespass does not occur when the injected, 
 95. Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. 1961). 
 96. Id. at 415. 
 97. Id. at 415. 
 98. Id. (“While the drilling bit of Gregg’s well is not alleged to have 
extended into Delhi-Taylor’s land, the same result is achieved if in fact the 
cracks or veins extended into its land and gas is produced therefrom by Gregg. 
To constitute a trespass, entry upon another’s land need not be in person, but 
may be made by causing or permitting a thing to cross the boundary of the 
premises.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
 99. Id. at 419. 
 100. See, e.g., Zinke & Trumbo, Ltd. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 749 P.2d 21, 28 
(Kan. 1988) (holding that a fracture treatment must be considered when 
determining value of drained oil for a proration order). 
 101. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 102. R.R. Comm’n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 567 (Tex. 1962). 
 103. Id. (citing Gregg, 344 S.W.2d at 411). 
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secondary forces moves across lease lines.”104 
A Kansas case further establishes the ability of permitted 
injection operations to cross property lines free of subsurface 
trespass concerns. In Crawford v. Hrabe, the lessee and 
operator of oil and gas wells sought to enjoin the owner of the 
property from cutting water lines that carried salt water from 
other plots of land to be injected as part of a secondary recovery 
operation.105 The owner of the land objected to the injection of 
water produced from wells off-site, as the lease allowed only 
“water produced on said land” for injection to enhance 
production.106 However, the regulatory agency issued an order 
that allowed for secondary recovery in order to prevent waste 
and allow additional oil to be recovered from the disputed 
well.107 The court deferred to the agency’s order in holding that 
“the injection of salt water was necessary . . . in order to 
sustain production.”108 
f. Societal Good 
Substantial deference is accorded to activities that are 
determined by states to be in the public interest to prevent 
economic waste and ensure maximum levels of production.109 
For plaintiffs alleging harm, this preference towards production 
and elimination of waste means a higher bar for recovery.110 In 
Pennsylvania, the Oil and Gas Conservation Law states that, 
“[i]t is . . . an expression of policy to be in the public interest to 
foster, encourage, and promote the development, production, 
and utilization of the natural oil and gas resources in this 
 104. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d at 568. 
 105. Crawford v. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442, 444–45 (Kan. 2002). 
 106. Id. at 447. 
 107. Id. at 451. 
 108. Id. at 452. 
 109. See, e.g., Anschutz Corp. v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 923 
P.2d 751, 755 (Wyo. 1996) (describing the purpose of the state’s law on oil and 
gas production as establishing regulation to prevent wasted resources); Mobil 
Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 908 P.2d 1276, 1282 
(Kan. 1995) (“The statutes governing the production and conservation of 
natural gas in Kansas empower the K[ansas] C[orporation] C[ommission] to 
prevent waste . . . .”). 
 110. Sometimes this even means that the surface owner is unable to 
recover anything. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 568 (Tex. 
1962) (holding that the public necessity of secondary recovery operations 
outweighs individual harm and that if subsurface trespass was a valid cause 
of action, secondary recovery operations would cease). 
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Commonwealth . . . in such manner as will encourage 
discovery, exploration, and development without waste.”111 The 
emphasis on the public good has been a bulwark of oil and gas 
law for over a century, although competing “public goods” such 
as environmental and human health invite further discussion 
on the continuing applicability of the dominance of oil and gas 
for the public good. 
2. The LEAF decision and its reverberations 
In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit decided an important case. 
Although effectively undone by Congress, it still affects the 
current discussion of hydraulic fracturing. In Legal 
Environmental Assistance Foundation v. U.S. EPA, an 
environmental group from Alabama—Legal Environmental 
Assistance Foundation (LEAF)—sought to force the EPA to 
withdraw approval of Alabama’s Underground Injection 
Control (UIC) program.112 The UIC program has its roots in the 
Safe Drinking Water Act’s (SDWA) mandate to protect public 
underground sources of drinking water.113 The Act allows 
states to apply for primary enforcement responsibility,114 
pending EPA approval, if the state chooses to run its own 
program using the EPA standards as a regulatory floor.115 This 
is precisely what Alabama did in 1982 (for Class II injection 
wells)116 and in 1983 (for Class I, III, IV, and V wells).117 The 
EPA approved the applications in both instances, ceding 
primary regulation to the state.118 Over a decade later, in 1994, 
LEAF petitioned the EPA to withdraw approval of the Alabama 
UIC program because it alleged that the program did not 
regulate hydraulic fracturing.119 The EPA denied the petition, 
declaring that hydraulic fracturing fell outside of the definition 
 111. Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Conservation Law, 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 401 
(historical note) (1996). 
 112. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 118 F.3d 
1467, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 113. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1) (2006). 
 114. 42 U.S.C. § 300h–1(b). 
 115. 40 C.F.R. § 145.21 (2010). 
 116. Class I wells inject waste, Class II wells inject fluids associated with 
oil and gas production and hydrocarbon storage, Class III wells inject solution 
mining fluids, Class IV wells inject hazardous or radioactive waste, and Class 
V wells govern all other injected material. 40 C.F.R. § 146.5 (2010). 
 117. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 118 F.3d at 1470. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1471. 
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of underground injection because, according to its 
interpretation, the UIC program applied only to wells whose 
“principal function” was the injection of fluids.120 The 11th 
Circuit performed a Chevron analysis121 on the EPA’s 
interpretation and determined that the statutory definition of 
“underground injection” did indeed include hydraulic 
fracturing.122 The ruling required Alabama to submit an 
application to the EPA to regulate hydraulic fracturing under 
the UIC program, which it eventually did in 1999 through an 
alternative demonstration program (which LEAF 
unsuccessfully contested) contained in the SDWA.123 
After the ruling, some commentators predicted severe 
repercussions for the fracing industry, both in uncertain 
liability and increased costs of compliance.124 Soon, an 
industry-friendly legislative remedy was proposed that would 
overturn the court’s decision and exempt hydraulic fracturing 
from the SDWA.125 In 2005, a provision in the Energy Policy 
Act explicitly amended the SDWA to exempt hydraulic 
fracturing fluids, with the exception of diesel fuel, from 
regulation.126 Further discussion on the regulation of injected 
material is found in the following section. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1473–78; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“First, always, is the question whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 
 122. Legal Envt’l Assistance Found., 118 F.3d at 1474–75 (“The process of 
hydraulic fracturing obviously falls within this definition, as it involves the 
subsurface emplacement of fluids . . . .”). 
 123. See Legal Envt’l Assistance Found. v. U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 276 
F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001). The court did, however, order the EPA to 
consider more fully whether hydraulic fracturing of coalbeds fell under class II 
well regulation. Id. at 1264. 
 124. Markus G. Puder, Did the Eleventh Circuit Crack “Frac”? — Hydraulic 
Fracturing After the Court’s Landmark LEAF Decision, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
507, 538–43. 
 125. Id. at 547–49 (noting that a rider had been attached to an 
appropriations bill to exempt hydraulic fracturing from federal regulation but 
that the rider was dropped from the bill before passage). 
 126. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 322, 19 Stat. 594, 694 
(2005) (“The term ‘underground injection’ . . . excludes . . . the underground 
injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to 
hydraulic fracturing operations . . . .”). 
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E. REGULATING THE SUBSURFACE 
The courts are not the only forum discussing and changing 
the law of hydraulic fracturing. In many ways, regulatory 
agencies have a much greater impact on the day-to-day 
operations of hydraulic fracturing than courts do. They are the 
entities that review new well drilling and hydraulic fracturing 
projects and, at the state level, have been at the forefront of 
developing and enforcing requirements related to hydraulic 
fracturing. States have enjoyed this prominence due in part to 
the 2005 exemption of hydraulic fracturing from federal 
regulation127 and because of the history and expertise of states 
in regulating the oil and gas industry. 
1. Federal Regulation 
The purpose of the SDWA is “to assure that water supply 
systems serving the public meet minimum national standards 
for protection of public health.”128 One of the main provisions of 
the SDWA is language that enables the EPA to create the 
Underground Injection Control (UIC) program to regulate 
injection of material that could impair underground sources of 
drinking water.129 The law allows states to assume “primacy” of 
regulation, pending EPA approval; if a state does not wish to 
regulate (as is the case for Pennsylvania, among others), the 
EPA regulates directly.130 The UIC program regulates all 
injection, except for the injection of natural gas for storage and 
hydraulic fracturing fluids.131 The EPA may not establish 
requirements for many oil and gas production-related fluids 
unless such regulations are “essential to assure that 
underground sources of drinking water will not be endangered 
by such injection.”132 However, states may require oil and gas 
companies to have UIC permits for these activities, a 
requirement for Pennsylvania wells.133 
 127. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, § 322, 19 Stat. 594, 694 
(2005). 
 128. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1185, at 1 (1974). 
 129. See 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2006) (enabling language for regulation); 40 
C.F.R. § 146 (2010) (UIC program). 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2006) (“Regulations for State programs”). 
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B) (2006). 
 132. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(2) (2006). 
 133. 25 PA. CODE § 78.18(a) (2010) (“(a) A person may not drill a disposal or 
enhanced recovery well or alter an existing well to be a disposal or enhanced 
recovery well unless the person: . . . Submits with the well permit application 
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2. State, Regional, and Municipal Regulation 
In Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection (PDEP) and the Bureau of Oil and 
Gas Management (OGM) within the PDEP regulate oil and gas 
extraction in the state.134 A prospective driller must secure a 
permit and a form of financial assurance (such as a bond) for 
the planned well before drilling can commence.135 The permit 
requires that the applicant prepare a disposal plan for the 
storage and treatment of production-related fluids, including 
fracing fluid, and submit the approved UIC Class II permit 
application from the EPA.136 The main statutes governing the 
regulation of oil and gas activities are the Coal and Gas 
Resource Coordination Act, the Oil and Gas Conservation Law, 
and the Clean Streams Law.137 Interstate commissions and 
municipalities also control aspects of the oil and gas industry, 
primarily water usage on the basin-level and land use, 
respectively.138 In 2009, the PDEP took 628 enforcement 
actions on gas wells in the state for violations found after 
inspection.139 For comparison, the table below shows 
enforcement staff, wells overseen, and enforcement action 
taken in 2009 for Texas, Michigan, Wyoming and 
Pennsylvania. The enforcement staff and enforcement actions 
vary widely from state to state. 
a copy of the well permit, approved permit application and required related 
documentation submitted for the disposal or enhanced recovery well to the 
EPA under 40 C.F.R. Part 146 (relating to underground injection control 
program).”). 
 134. See Bureau of Oil & Gas Management Home Page, PA DEP’T OF 
ENVTL. PROT., 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/oilgas.htm (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2011). 
 135. See 25 PA. CODE § 78.71–111 (2010). 
 136. §§ 78.18, 78.51, 78.55. 
 137. Coal and Gas Resource Coordination Act, 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 501 
(1996); Oil and Gas Conservation Act, 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 401 (1996); Clean 
Streams Law, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 691 (1996). 
 138. See generally Laura C. Reeder, Note, Creating a Legal Framework for 
Regulation of Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale Formation, 34 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 999, 1015–20 (2010) (summarizing 
various regulatory entities in Pennsylvania responsible for oil and gas 
production). 
 139. Abrahm Lustgarten & Sabrina Shankman, Pennsylvania Drilling 
Tracker, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/gas-drilling-regulatory-
staffing/states/PA (last visited Mar. 21, 2011). 
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Table 1: A comparison of enforcement staff and action 
taken on natural gas wells in four states140 
State Enforcement 
Staff 
Gas 
Wells 
Enforcement 
Actions in 
2009 
Pennsylvania 76 77,310 628 
Texas 105 273,660 549 
Michigan 36 16,493 36 
Wyoming 11 33,490 N/A 
States and other entities have taken other action in 
response to concerns related to hydraulic fracturing activities. 
To provide a few examples, in New York, a temporary 
moratorium was passed that banned fracing until May 2011 to 
give the Legislature more time to investigate the practice and 
attendant environmental concerns.141 Then Governor Ed 
Rendell of Pennsylvania issued a moratorium on gas leasing in 
State Forest lands in October 2010.142 A new Wyoming rule 
requires comprehensive disclosure of fracing fluids currently 
considered to be trade secrets by industry.143 In November 
2010, the city council of Pittsburgh voted unanimously to ban 
natural gas drilling within city limits, the first city in 
                                                          
 140. Abrahm Lustgarten & Sabrina Shankman, How Big is the Gas 
Drilling Regulatory Staff in Your State?, PROPUBLICA, 
http://projects.propublica.org/gas-drilling-regulatory-staffing (last visited Mar. 
21, 2011) (interactive feature showing regulatory staff in various states). 
 141. Abrahm Lustgarten & Nicholas Kusnetz, New York Passes Temporary 
Ban on Hydraulic Fracturing, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 4, 2010, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/new-york-senate-passes-temporary-ban-on-
hydraulic-fracturing. 
 142. Press Release, Edward G. Rendell, Governor of Pa., Governor Rendell 
Signs Moratorium Protecting Sensitive State Forest Land from Future 
Natural Gas Leases (Oct. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.dcnr.state.pa.us/news/newsreleases/2010/1010-
sfdrillingmoratorium.htm. 
 143. See, e.g., Nicholas Kusnetz, Wyoming Fracking Rules Would Disclose 
Drilling Chemicals, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 14, 2010, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/wyoming-fracking-rules-would-disclose-
drilling-chemicals. 
 796 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 12:2 
 
                                                          
 
Pennsylvania to take such an action.144 Finally, the Delaware 
River Basin Commission, a government agency created by an 
interstate compact and consisting of four states—Delaware, 
New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania—recently released 
draft rules that would require permits for hydraulic fracturing 
operations in the basin.145 The plan requires financial 
assurance of $125,000 per well, approval of water sources and 
disposal methods, and well pad siting requirements.146 
An alternate method of regulation that doesn’t involve 
permitting or more traditional routes of control over industries 
is to require public disclosure of certain information from 
industry. Disclosure of chemicals used by industrial facilities is 
one way to control the social costs of economic production, costs 
not borne by the consumer and thus not optimized by the 
producer.147 The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program, which 
began in 1986 with passage of the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)148 and is 
administered by the EPA, is the a well-known example of such 
a program.149 The TRI program does not, however, cover the 
disclosure of chemicals involved in the area of oil and gas 
extraction.150 But in spite of the historical reluctance of oil and 
gas companies to disclose information about the chemicals used 
in hydraulic fracturing, there are signs that this is beginning to 
 144. See Joe Smydo, City OKs Ban on Gas Drilling, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Nov. 17, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/10321/1103877-53.stm. 
 145. Proposed Amendments to the Water Quality Regulations, Water Code 
and Comprehensive Plan to Provide for Regulation of Natural Gas 
Development Projects, 76 Fed. Reg. 295 (proposed Jan. 4, 2011) (to be codified 
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 410). 
 146. See DRBC Draft Natural Gas Development Regulations “At-A-Glance” 
Fact Sheet, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N (Dec. 9, 2010), 
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/naturalgas-draftregs-factsheet.pdf. 
 147. William F. Pedersen, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel 
Universes and Beyond, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 151 (2001) (noting that in 
an attempt to control these social costs, Congress and agencies have begun to 
develop disclosure programs with the goal of assisting individual choice 
through access to information). 
 148. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
11001–11050 (2006). 
 149. See Pedersen, supra note 147, at 152 (describing the TRI program as 
“the oldest, most established, and best publicized federal social cost disclosure 
program”). 
 150. See 40 C.F.R. § 372.23 (2010) (listing the covered industries under 
EPCRA). 
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change. 
Most notably, some states have woven chemical disclosure 
requirements into their well permitting processes.151 Wyoming 
was the first state to institute disclosure requirements when its 
Oil and Gas Conservation Commission finalized rules that 
went into effect September 15, 2010.152 Pennsylvania also 
requires disclosure in the state’s oil and gas well permitting 
rules, although the language is not as explicit as Wyoming’s 
rule.153 It has been considered a significant accomplishment 
that a state like Wyoming, long-known for its ties to the fossil 
fuel industry, is leading the charge towards more 
transparency.154 
There has also been recent action by industry or industry 
groups related to disclosure. In late 2010, the Ground Water 
Protection Council (GWPC)155 and the Interstate Oil and Gas 
Compact Commission (IOGCC)156 announced development of a 
public, voluntary, industry-supported online registry to compile 
information regarding chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing 
operations.157 Finally, the federal government recently 
 151. See Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured 
Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 271–74 (2010) (describing the disclosure 
requirements of states within the Marcellus Shale and noting that while all 
states have permit requirements of basic disclosure (covering disposal, 
location of well, and location in relation to water), only New York and 
Pennsylvania have explicitly mandated chemical disclosure). 
 152. See 055 003 WYO. CODE R. § 45(d) (2010) (“The Owner or Operator 
shall provide . . . for each stage of the [hydraulic fracturing] well simulation 
program, the chemical additives, compounds and concentrations or            
rates . . . .”); Mike Soraghan, Wyo. Natural Gas Fracking Rules for [sic] Point 
the Way for Public Disclosure of Chemicals Used, GREENWIRE (Dec. 20, 2010), 
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2010/12/20/1/. 
 153. 25 PA. CODE § 78.55 (2006) (“Prior to generation of waste, the well 
operator shall prepare and implement a plan . . . for the control and disposal of 
fluids . . . including . . . stimulation fluids . . . .”). 
 154. See Soraghan, supra note 152 (reporting that there has been 
“relatively little grumbling” from industry since the rules in Wyoming took 
effect). 
 155. The GWPC is a non-profit organization consisting of a collection of 
state regulatory officials who manage their states’ groundwater regulatory 
programs. About Us, GROUNDWATER PROT. COUNCIL, 
http://www.gwpc.org/about_us/about_us.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2011). 
 156. The IOGCC is a multi-state agency advocating the interests of oil and 
gas states. About Us, INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, 
http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/about-us (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). 
 157. See Press Release, Ground Water Protection Council, Ground Water 
Protection Council to Develop and Implement a State-Based System 
Disclosing Chemicals Used in Hydraulic Fracturing (Sept. 28, 2010), available 
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expressed interest in considering chemical disclosure 
regulations for hydraulic fracturing operations done on public 
lands.158 This came after separate instances in which Congress 
and the EPA had asked for information, including chemical 
data, from companies involved in fracing, with moderate 
success.159 Disclosure of frac-chemicals has also gained traction 
from legal scholars.160 
III. STRIKING A BALANCE: ECONOMICS, ENERGY, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
This Note is an attempt to address a controversial issue, 
but the author acknowledges that no issue, especially a 
controversial one, exists within a vacuum. Natural gas is an 
integral component of our modern lives. So, while the proposals 
in this section address hydraulic fracturing, care was taken to 
consider how the changes would also fit in a broader context 
at http://www.gwpc.org/e-
library/documents/general/Media%20release%20with%20resolution%2010-
1.pdf; Press Release, American Petroleum Institute, API Endorses State-
Based Proposal From GWPC and IOGCC on Hydraulic Fracturing Chemical 
Disclosure (Dec. 14, 2010), available at  
http://www.api.org/Newsroom/chemical-disclosure.cfm. 
 158. See Ben Geman, Interior Mulls Policy on Disclosure of Gas ‘Fracking’ 
Fluids, E2 WIRE (Nov. 30, 2010, 1:41 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-
e2-wire/131151-interior-mulls-policy-on-disclosure-of-gas-fracking-fluids 
(quoting Department of Interior Secretary Ken Salazar as considering 
chemical disclosure regulation for public lands); see also Letter from Rep. 
Maurice Hinchey et al., to Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior (Jan. 12, 
2011), available at http://degette.house.gov/images/pdf/011211salazarletter.pdf 
(urging the Department of Interior to develop chemical disclosure regulations, 
co-signed by 46 members of Congress). 
 159. See Memorandum from Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman of the Comm. 
on Energy and Commerce, and Edward Markey, Subcomm. Chairman to 
Members of the Subcomm. on Energy and Env’t, U.S. House of 
Representatives (July 19, 2010), available at 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100719/Memo.Hydr
aulic.Fracturing.07.19.2010.pdf (describing the efforts of the committee in 
2010 to get information from hydraulic fracturing and energy companies via a 
series of letters to the companies); Letter from Lisa Jackson, Adm’r of the 
EPA, to nine hydraulic fracturing companies (Sept. 9, 2010), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/H
Fvoluntaryinformationrequest.pdf (requesting, among others, specific 
chemical names and descriptions used for hydraulic fracturing by the company 
in the past five years). 
 160. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 151, at 283 (calling for states in the 
Marcellus shale region to mandate disclosure of chemicals used in hydraulic 
fracturing). 
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and how they may be applied in other related scenarios as well. 
The first part of this section discusses previous legal and 
regulatory proposals to address hydraulic fracturing. Then, a 
set of proposals is introduced to address hydraulic fracturing 
law and regulation. 
 
A. LEGAL AND REGULATORY RESPONSES TO HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING 
1. Legal Proposals 
As it has in the past, subsurface trespass is likely to 
remain at the forefront of future disputes arising from 
hydraulic fracturing. Courts have shied away from expressly 
ruling whether hydraulic fracturing constitutes a trespass since 
the Texas Supreme Court withdrew its per curium opinion 
stating that it did constitute a trespass in 1992.161 Some 
commentators have called for courts to declare that fracturing 
across property lines is not a subsurface trespass.162 Such a 
declaration could encourage developers to frac more extensively 
by decreasing the threat of litigation and promoting further 
development of a valuable resource.163 However, the downside 
of such a proposal would be the hollowing-out of the rule of 
capture. Instead of allowing for competition in the fair capture 
of a resource, it would permit an operator to operate in another 
interest-holder’s land with limited recourse for the affected 
 161. See Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., No. D-1678, 1992 WL 
80263 at *2 (Tex. Oct. 28, 1992) (opinion withdrawn and replaced by Geo 
Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., 839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992)); see also 
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2008) 
(“We need not decide the broader issue [of whether hydraulic fracturing 
constitutes a trespass] here.”). 
 162. See Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass”: A Man’s Subsurface is 
Not His Castle, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 247, 281–82 (2010) (“The subsurface 
invasions listed above meet important societal needs, which must be 
commercial (economically efficient) if they are to succeed. A strict application 
of trespass law to the subsurface, particularly the ability to enjoin a 
continuing trespass, could in some, perhaps many, instances make the 
difference between an economic and uneconomic enterprise.”); John W. 
Broomes, Wrestling with a Downhole Dilemma: Subsurface Trespass, 
Correlative Rights, and the Need for Hydraulic Fracturing in Tight Reservoirs, 
53 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 20-1, at 20-13 (2007) (suggesting that courts 
could declare that a fracture extending across property lines is not a 
subsurface trespass). 
 163. See Broomes, supra note 162, at 20-13. 
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party.164 
Such a broad declaration may limit the ability of affected 
parties to obtain recourse for actual harm, such as the 
impairment of another production well or water source due to a 
hydraulic fracturing treatment. It would provide excessive 
cover for an already under-regulated practice and could have 
negative implications for emerging subsurface uses like 
geologic sequestration, aquifer recharge, and geothermal 
energy, activities with little judicial treatment thus far. 
Finally, although state courts and regulatory agencies have 
traditional purview over oil and gas matters,165 the more 
crowded future subsurface will benefit from a more holistic 
assessment of subsurface rights, which takes into account more 
than just economic gain and elimination of hydrocarbon waste. 
Another proposal, which would also apply more generally 
to other environmental statutes, is an enhanced recognition of 
citizens’ suits by courts.166 Such recognition would maintain 
the prominent role of state and federal regulatory agencies.  As 
many agencies are understaffed and over-worked, citizen 
participation could help to fill in the gaps in environmental 
accountability.167 A potential weakness in relying on 
enforcement by state regulatory agencies is the “race to the 
bottom” borne out in the balance regulators are forced to strike 
between protecting the environment and protecting the 
interests of industry who could take their operations to other, 
less regulated states.168 Citizens’ suits, however, face an uphill 
battle in the courts after a Supreme Court decision, Lujan v. 
 164. Id. at 20-13 to -14. 
 165. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2006) (showing deference in UIC requirements 
for state oil and gas operations); JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 18 (1995) (noting the development of state oil and gas conservation 
laws). 
 166. See Will Reisinger, Trent A. Dougherty & Nolan Moser, 
Environmental Enforcement and the Limits of Cooperative Federalism: Will 
Courts Allow Citizen Suits to Pick Up the Slack?, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 1, 2 (2010) (“[W]hile Congress intended federal and state agencies to hold 
primary enforcement responsibilities, legislators also included provisions 
allowing private citizens to enforce the laws when the government was 
unwilling or unable to do so.”) 
 167. See id. at 2; Abrahm Lustgarten, State Oil and Gas Regulators Are 
Spread Too Thin to Do Their Jobs, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 30, 2009, 12:38 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/state-oil-and-gas-regulators-are-spread-too-
thin-to-do-their-jobs-1230. 
 168. See Reisinger, supra note 166, at 19. 
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Defenders of Wildlife, held that a citizen suit brought under the 
Endangered Species Act lacked standing.169 Finally, despite the 
inclusion of a citizen suit provision in the SDWA, it would be 
impossible to force an agency to regulate something that it is 
exempted by law from doing, as is the case with hydraulic 
fracturing, the EPA, and the SDWA.170 The next section will 
address this and other regulatory issues. 
2. Regulatory Proposals 
Although actors in the gas and oil industry have been 
resistant to regulation, a permitted activity can provide a level 
of protection from liability against causes of action like 
subsurface trespass.171 To that end, many have proposed a new 
regulatory structure for hydraulic fracturing. A “Marcellus 
Shale Compact Commission” would focus on planning on a 
multi-state scale, with a priority interest in protecting water 
resource needs.172 It would have the ability to make 
environmental decisions on a broader level than states are able 
to and would relieve some regulatory pressure from state 
agencies.173 However, it is unclear exactly how such a 
Commission would fit into existing oil and gas regulatory 
schemes or how state agencies and region-wide industries 
would react. It is one proposal, however, that could help 
broaden the focus of regulators and state actors from a strictly 
“waste not” mentality regarding resource production towards 
protection of the environment. 
On the federal level, there have been calls to regulate 
fracing under a portion of the SDWA that addresses wells that 
inject other oil and gas-related fluids. However, this section 
requires a finding by the EPA that the injection of the oil and 
 169. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (“To permit 
Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ 
compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to 
permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief 
Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed’ . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 170. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2006) (citizen suit provision of SDWA); 42 U.S.C. § 
300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) (“Halliburton Loophole” exempting hydraulic 
fracturing from EPA regulation in SDWA). 
 171. See generally Anderson, supra note 162, at 268–81 (describing 
subsurface trespass in several situations and how permits can sometimes 
insulate an operator from liability, but only to a certain extent). 
 172. See Reeder, supra note 138, at 1023–24. 
 173. Id. 
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gas fluids will endanger sources of drinking water wells before 
it can regulate those wells.174 Further, it is not clear whether 
the EPA could actually regulate fracing-related injection due to 
the exemption in the SDWA.175 The agency does regulate the 
disposal of oil and gas waste through the Underground 
Injection Program specified in SDWA regulations—indirectly 
regulating fracing without explicitly doing so.176 Due to this 
statutory obstacle, others have called for the repeal of the 
exemption by Congress, which could lead to a regulatory 
framework that addresses broader issues than state regulation 
could, including migration of pollution across state lines, 
protection of sparsely populated regions’ water supply, and 
better application of findings from national studies like the one 
currently underway at the EPA.177 Efforts in both houses of 
Congress were made to repeal the exemption and mandate 
disclosure of chemicals, although neither bill passed the 111th 
Congress.178 
B. SUBSURFACE 2.0: RE-IMAGINING THE LAW GOVERNING 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
The following is a collection of proposals to balance public 
and private interests through changes to laws, regulations, and 
policies governing hydraulic fracturing. Protection of 
environmental and human health is paramount, but realistic 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(c) (addressing the duties of the EPA in the case of 
a state choosing not to pursue primary enforcement of the UIC program under 
the SDWA, “Such program may not include requirements which interfere with 
or impede . . . any underground injection for the secondary or tertiary recovery 
of oil or natural gas, unless such requirements are essential to assure that 
underground sources of drinking water will not be endangered by such 
injection.”); Angela C. Cupas, Note, The Not-So-Safe Drinking Water Act: Why 
We Must Regulate Hydraulic Fracturing at the Federal Level, 33 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 605, 629 (2009) (“[I]t appears entirely reasonable to 
require that hydraulic fracturing activities meet the more lenient standards 
required under section 1425 of the SDWA.”). 
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 176. See 40 C.F.R. § 146.5 (2010). 
 177. See Wiseman, supra note 45, at 183–87; Halliburton Loophole, supra 
note 20, at A28 (calling for a close of the “Halliburton Loophole”). 
 178. See Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) 
Act of 2009, H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. (2009) (sponsored by Rep. Diana DeGette 
(D-CO) and co-sponsored by seventy-two other members); Fracturing 
Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S. 1215, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (sponsored by Sen. Robert Casey Jr. and co-sponsored by nine other 
Senators). 
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proposals also incorporate the significant economic and security 
interests of the states and the energy sector. Thus, the four 
proposals call for changes to the legal and regulatory landscape 
of hydraulic fracturing through executive, administrative, 
industry, state, and judicial action. 
 
 
1. Place a moratorium on new hydraulic fracturing operations 
on federally-owned land until findings from the EPA study are 
released and show that it has no adverse effect on drinking 
water resources. 
A moratorium on hydraulic fracturing, even though it 
would be temporary and only applicable to new leases for 
natural gas operations employing hydraulic fracturing on 
federally owned land, would give scientists and regulators a 
chance to “catch up” with the advancements made in the past 
five years in the technology. It could be ordered by the 
President via an executive order and implemented by the 
Department of the Interior, the executive agency that manages 
the nation’s publically owned lands and leases.179 
Moratoria of certain natural gas activities are not without 
precedent. Some states and municipalities have, for instance, 
already banned hydraulic fracturing on state lands or until 
studies on the environmental effects of the practice on drinking 
water sources can be completed.180 Analogously, moratoria on 
offshore drilling have been a contentious political issue for 
thirty years, from a Congressional moratorium in 1982, to an 
executive order issued by President George H.W. Bush in 1990 
extending the moratorium, to President Obama’s issuance, 
court-rejection, and finally, lifting of a deepwater moratorium 
in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010.181 
 179. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, WHAT WE DO, 
http://www.doi.gov/whatwedo/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 28, 2011). 
 180. See, e.g., Gov. Edward G. Rendell, supra note 142 (announcing the 
moratorium on gas leases in Pennsylvania State Forests); Mireya Navarro, 
N.Y. Senate Approves Fracking Moratorium, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 1010, 1:23 
PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/n-y-senate-approves-fracking-
moratorium/ (reporting on passage by the N.Y. Senate of a bill that would 
establish a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing until May 2011). 
 181. See, e.g., Steven Lee Myers & Carl Hulse, Bush Acts on Drilling, 
Challenging Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2008, at A13 (describing the 
lifting of the presidential moratorium on offshore drilling by President Bush in 
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Despite the existence of long-running moratoria on certain 
areas of fossil fuel extraction, the industry seems to come out 
unscathed and there is no reason to believe that a brief 
moratorium on new gas leases on federal land would cripple 
one of the nation’s more profitable industries. 
Finally, this proposal hews to the precautionary principle 
of regulating under scientific uncertainty. The precautionary 
principle states that “rather than await [scientific] certainty, 
regulators should act in anticipation of environmental harm to 
ensure that this harm does not occur.”182 However useful this 
concept may be in the abstract, its application can be 
complicated: instead of weighing caution versus risk, the 
regulator finds itself instead weighing the risk against the risk 
created by the principle itself.183 In the context of hydraulic 
fracturing, the precautionary principle could be a beacon 
guiding state and federal regulators through the circus act of 
balancing the promotion of production while also protecting the 
public and environment. Further, the degree of scientific 
certainty will never be complete and will always be a bone of 
contention between the public and industry, but by hewing to 
the precautionary principle, regulators will be further assured 
of the soundness of their management. 
2. The Pennsylvania state court should declare that extending 
hydraulic fracturing onto another interest holder’s property is a 
trespass, but shield properly permitted operators from liability 
when acting within the scope of their permit. The legislature 
should also revise well spacing regulations to reflect the 
emergence of hydraulic fracturing. 
The rule of capture looms large over all oil and gas-based 
subsurface trespass cases,184 and for good reason: its use as a 
2008 and noting the history of offshore drilling moratoria); Peter Baker & 
John M. Broder, U.S. Lifts the Ban on Deep Drilling, with New Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, at A1, available at, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/us/13drill.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/20
10/10/13/us/13drill.html (summarizing President Obama’s deepwater offshore 
drilling moratorium’s progress and lifting). 
 182. Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary 
Principle, 33 ENV’T 4, 4 (1991). 
 183. See id. at 43 (noting that the precautionary principle may be more 
useful as a general goal than as a specific solution to decrease the risk of 
environmental harm through regulation). 
 184. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 
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doctrine has served the industry well in encouraging 
production and limiting economic waste. Pooling, unitization, 
and the fair use doctrine provide adequate remedies for 
adjacent interest-holders who may be at risk for drainage or 
encroachment from a hydrocarbon production operation. 
However, the remedies available to an interest holder who has 
concerns about hydraulic fracturing for environmental, not 
production reasons, are less certain without an express 
declaration that hydraulic fracturing—either the estimated 
extent of the fracture or flood—constitutes a subsurface 
trespass. 
Pennsylvania is not Texas. The two states have different 
histories and interests, and Pennsylvania should not be 
beholden to a state whose highest court cited, as reason not to 
alter the rule of capture, the fact that industry did not want it 
to change.185 This is somewhat akin to the Michigan Supreme 
Court deciding that catalytic converters were not necessary 
pollution-abatement technologies because the automotive 
industry did not want the change. Importantly, declaring 
hydraulic fracturing to be a subsurface trespass would not 
preclude the rule of capture in the case where an interest 
holder alleges drainage from under their property. It would 
help those seeking injunctions to stop the physical invasion of a 
fracture into their interest. 
There is a question of whether the trespass would also 
include the flood of frac fluid or displaced brine due to the 
changes in subsurface pressure that fracing induces. Although 
estimates of the extent of migrated fluids may be more difficult 
to determine than estimates of the extent of the fractures, this 
is not to say that it is less important. In fact, if the purpose of 
regulation is to protect water resources, it may be more 
significant if some fluid has breached a boundary than if a 
fracture has. Although, if a fracture has crossed a subsurface 
boundary, it is almost certain then that some fluid has also 
crossed a property interest;186 thus, a requirement that fluids 
1, 13 (Tex. 2008) (“The rule of capture is a cornerstone of the oil and gas 
industry and is fundamental both to property rights and to state regulation.”). 
 185. See id. at 16 (“[T]he law of capture should not be changed to apply 
differently to hydraulic fracturing because no one in the industry appears to 
want or need the change.”). 
 186. This is so because the opened fracture is the pathway though which 
the fluid flows and, because the fluid is under pressure, it is reasonable to 
believe that the extent of the fluid would be to at least the extent of the 
fracture. 
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not cross boundaries would thus be more protective to an 
adjacent interest-holder than a fracture-only requirement. As 
an added benefit (or, to some, a burden), such a stipulation 
would also encourage well operators to develop accurate models 
of their fluid plumes. 
Importantly, such a declaration would have a negligible 
impact on most hydraulic fracturing operations—it is difficult 
to imagine a gas company acquiring such a small interest that 
its operations would be at constant risk of interacting with 
other properties. Further, there are certain steps regulators 
and companies can take to make adoption of the rule even 
easier. Pennsylvania should revise its well spacing regulation 
to include boundary restrictions (the closest distance to another 
property line that a well can be drilled) for horizontal well 
laterals and estimates of the extent of the fracture and flood.187 
This would help protect adjacent interest holders from 
subsurface trespass and extend a liability shield for operators 
who would then have regulatory approval for their hydraulic 
fracturing operations, all achieved through only minimal 
regulatory rulemaking. 
3. Mandate disclosure of chemicals used in hydraulic 
fracturing and integrate data into a database coordinated with 
the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission and federal, 
state, and local agencies. 
A variety of stakeholders—including industry, state 
agencies, federal agencies, and members of Congress—
increasingly view disclosure of chemicals used in hydraulic 
fracturing as a viable component of regulatory reform.188 
Several states have currently established more comprehensive 
disclosure requirements than the federal government, 
specifically Wyoming, Pennsylvania, and New York.189 But 
these states amount to only a small fraction of the states with 
 187. As it currently exists, Pennsylvania’s well spacing code states, “The 
requested location of the well may not conflict with a spacing or pooling order 
previously entered or pending before the Department, and the requested 
location shall be at least 330 feet from the nearest outside boundary line of the 
lease on which it is located.” 25 PA. CODE § 79.11(b) (1998). This language 
could be modified to read, in part, “The requested location of the well, 
including the extent of the lateral and fractures, may not . . . .” 
 188. For a summary of recent chemical disclosure initiatives related to 
hydraulic fracturing, see supra Part II.E.2. 
 189. See discussion supra Part II.E.2. 
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hydraulic fracturing operations. Furthermore, companies have 
the power to protect the identity of some chemicals by labeling 
them as trade secrets.190 A more comprehensive disclosure 
policy is required to ensure that regulators and the public have 
knowledge of the full nature of frac chemicals. 
This proposal will build on the various state disclosure 
requirements while combining the work done on an online 
database by the GWPC and IOGCC with the enforcement and 
resource capabilities of the federal government. The EPA 
should promulgate rules under the EPCRA to add hydraulic 
fracturing companies to the list of industries required to submit 
a Toxic Release Inventory report annually. Alternately, the 
agency could develop rules within EPCRA in conjunction with 
industry, industry groups, and state regulatory agencies to 
establish a new reporting program tailor-made for hydraulic 
fracturing. This program would specify what information about 
the chemicals must be disclosed (e.g., composition, quantity 
used, amount recovered/disposed of) and would limit 
companies’ ability to seek trade secret status for the chemicals. 
States would administer the data collection if they choose in 
conjunction with organizations like the GWPC and IOGCC, 
who are already working on data-gathering tools, with federal 
resources available as needed. The data would be available to 
the public and could further be used to set up a certification or 
permitting program, as introduced in the next section. 
There will be challenges in implementing such a program. 
Industry will be reluctant to submit to mandatory disclosure 
requirements and lose the ability to claim that frac chemicals 
are protectable trade secrets. Further, state and state-based 
organizations like GWPC and IOGCC might be wary of a 
program with significant federal involvement despite being 
able to take a prominent part in the formulation and 
administration of the program. But despite these challenges, 
establishing a federal program of mandatory disclosure would 
achieve several important goals. First, it would ensure that the 
patchwork of state disclosure laws is unified, with a federal 
floor specifying a minimum level of information that must be 
disclosed and is the same across the country. The program 
would also give the public valuable information regarding the 
 190. See Soraghan, supra note 152 (noting that, since the implementation 
of Wyoming’s disclosure rules, the state has agreed to too many industry 
requests to shield their chemical compounds as trade secrets). 
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chemicals used under their property and in their watersheds. 
This information can help identify bad actors and pressure 
them, and the industry as a whole, to use chemicals that are 
less harmful to the environment and people if spilled or leaked. 
Finally, the program would help both industry and government 
identify and develop best practices by using the chemical data 
to further refine the technical aspects of fracing. 
 
 
 
4. Use disclosure information to issue permits for hydraulic 
fracturing based on the use of environmentally safe chemicals. 
Require higher fees and higher limits to liability for companies 
that use chemicals shown to be harmful to the environment after 
review by the EPA. 
The final proposal takes regulation one step further than 
disclosure and calls for the issuance of permits based upon best 
practices garnered from data gathered from the chemical 
disclosure database and incorporating existing state and 
commission permit requirements relating to hydraulic 
fracturing. Aside from the public and environmental benefits of 
disclosure, collecting data from across the industry will also 
generate a large dataset that can be used in consultation with 
industry to identify a class of chemicals that are both 
environmentally friendly and effective. Once this class is 
identified, the use of these environmentally safer chemicals 
should be encouraged, through incentives, such as special 
designations (similar to Energy Star or LEED), reduced 
liability for potential leakage or contamination, outright bans 
on the most harmful chemicals, or by making it more difficult 
to use certain chemicals by requiring written justification by 
the operator prior to use, subject to regulatory or 
administrative approval. 
This proposal would likely require a repeal of the Safe 
Drinking Water exemption currently applied to hydraulic 
fracturing through a bill similar to the legislation introduced in 
the previous Congress.191 Such an act would require 
 191. See Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) 
Act of 2009, H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. (2009); Fracturing Responsibility and 
Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S. 1215, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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considerable political will and it appears unlikely to occur given 
the current makeup of Congress. However, the federal route is 
not the sole regulatory option. An entity like a river basin 
commission could issue such permits, although it is unclear 
whether it would have the resources and expertise to manage 
such a program. Further, regulation by commission could have 
a negative impact on the economy of the basin, especially if the 
shale formation covers a larger area than the basin’s 
jurisdiction and thus incentivizes industry to move away from 
the regulated areas. 
Despite the significant challenges this proposal presents, 
the controversy over hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus 
Shale could provide the requisite motivation for federal 
legislative action to address issues previously confined to 
certain state actors. The need for federal legislation, with the 
acknowledgement of the importance of continued state and 
industry input, is inextricably tied to the duty of the federal 
government to protect the nation’s environmental and public 
health. In studying the effects of hydraulic fracturing, the EPA 
is taking important first steps in collecting the information 
necessary for smart, not overly burdensome regulation. But 
this is simply the first step in what may be a long, difficult 
process of readjusting the balance between public and private 
interests. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The sudden emergence of hydraulic fracturing in geologic 
formations like Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale has the 
potential to be a tremendous resource for the region and the 
country. Apart from the obvious economic opportunities, fracing 
could produce real impacts on our energy portfolio, national 
security, and capacity for technological innovation. However, 
uncertainty surrounding the environmental effects as well as 
the regulatory and legal treatment of fracing could lead to 
unintended, perhaps lasting consequences. The proposals in 
this Note will attempt to shift the traditional resource-centric 
view of the subsurface to a more holistic view that takes into 
account other important viewpoints often overshadowed by the 
tremendous short term opportunity hydraulic fracturing 
presents. The proposals advocate steps to be taken in the 
courtroom, on the floor of Congress, and by our regulatory 
agencies. Industry is not treated as an opponent, but rather an 
ally who, if held to high, yet reasonable standards of 
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responsibility, has an opportunity to lend its considerable 
expertise towards effective regulation. Finally, the proposals 
recognize the traditional role of the states in oil and gas law 
and attempt to combine this unique expertise with the 
considerable resources and overarching goals of the federal 
government. 
Natural gas, like coal and oil, is destined to be a significant 
part of our nation’s energy mix for years to come and so it is 
critical that we take the necessary steps now to ensure that it 
is a sustainable future for everyone. The next chapter of our 
energy story is being written now—hydraulic fracturing is 
destined to be a main character, but there is hope that efficient, 
effective regulation and sound science will also take center 
stage and not find themselves relegated to bit player status. 
That would be a tragedy, indeed. 
 
